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Abstract
Does party competition affect political activism? This paper studies the deci-
sion of party supporters to join political campaigns. We present a framework
that incorporates supporters’ instrumental and expressive motives and illus-
trates that party competition can either increase or decrease party activism.
To distinguish between these competing predictions, we implemented a field
experiment with a European party during a national election. In a seemingly
unrelated party survey, we randomly assigned 1,417 party supporters to true
information that the canvassing activity of the main competitor party was
exceptionally high. Using unobtrusive, real-time data on party supporters’
canvassing behavior, we find that treated respondents are 30 percent less
likely to go canvassing. To investigate the causal mechanism, we leverage
additional survey evidence collected two months after the campaign. Con-
sistent with affective accounts of political activism, we show that increased
competition lowered party supporters’ political self-efficacy, which plausibly
led them to remain inactive.
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What explains why some citizens become politically active, while others remain
inert? The active engagement of citizens in politics is a crucial precondition for a
thriving democracy. Parties play a pivotal role in this process. They allow citizens to
voice their preferences and to take political action. The number of party members,
however, has seen substantial changes over the last two decades.1 Party members
have also become less active (Scarrow, 2017; Whiteley and Seyd, 2002; Whiteley,
2011). Meanwhile, the electoral landscape, too, has seen significant changes. In the
United States, there is increasing variation in the competitiveness of local electoral
races (Fraga and Hersh, 2018). In Europe, we observe a rise of new, often right-wing,
parties, which has fundamentally altered the nature of party competition (Oesch
and Rennwald, 2018).
Can changes in electoral competition help explain variation in political engage-
ment? More precisely, is party activism a product of competition between parties?
Scarrow (2017) notes that “upticks in [party] membership [are] often motivated by
close electoral contests” (see also, Detterbeck 2005). And Chong (2014, 76) seconds
that “political activists relish the competition and conflict of the political arena.”
Yet, empirical evidence for the link from competition to party activism is scarce.
There is a longstanding literature on the effect of election closeness on turnout. But
the findings are mixed. Focusing on the U.S., some studies provide evidence for a
positive competition-turnout link in elections at the federal (Grofman et al., 1998;
Pacheco, 2008) and state level (Flavin and Shufeldt, 2015), while others find no
such evidence neither for actual nor perceived competition (Huckfeldt et al., 2007;
Matsusaka, 1993). The lack of clear evidence has led some to argue that greater
party competition does not directly affect voters, but that it leads parties to make
1In the UK, for instance, the conservative party has lost over 100.000 members since 2002, while
labour gained nearly 300.000 members (Whiteley et al., 2019). In Germany, the same period saw
all major parties—save the Green party—lose a significant share of their members (Niedermayer,
2019).
1
greater mobilization efforts (Cox and Munger, 1989).
Among the few studies that focus on political engagement beyond turnout, Set-
tle et al. (2016) find that residents of U.S. battleground states are more likely to
discuss politics on Facebook. And Lipsitz (2009) seconds that the same residents
are also more likely to attend political events and to make political donations. The
existing studies, however, are correlational and operate at aggregate levels which,
as pointed out by Matsusaka and Palda (1993), may give rise to aggregation bias.
Most problematic, we currently lack evidence whether electoral competition also
affects party activism. The latter outcome, however, is arguably the most plausible
margin along which we would expect party competition to have a meaningful effect
(cp. Cox and Munger, 1989). Party activism is also a highly policy relevant outcome
if we are to sustain lively political campaigns.
This paper revisits the link between party competition and political activism
using a field experiment. To motivate our empirical analysis, we present a simple
theoretical framework that conceptualizes how increased party competition may af-
fect the benefits a party supporter derives from becoming politically active. First,
we consider instrumental benefits. We posit that if the supporter’s party is ahead
in the polls, a rise in effort by the competitor sets in motion two forces: Greater
competition makes a race tighter, which increases the likelihood that the supporter
is pivotal and may thus spur participation (Gerber et al., 2008; Olson, 1965). More-
over, increased competition means voters are exposed to more campaigning, which
can alter the supporter’s effectiveness. Second, we consider expressive benefits.
We argue that on one hand greater party competition can trigger anger towards
the competitor (Huddy et al., 2007) and enthusiasm toward the supporter’s own
party (Marcus et al., 2000), which may foster activism. On the other hand, greater
competition may provoke anxiety (Huddy et al., 2007) and curtail the supporter’s
self-efficacy (Campbell et al., 1954; Finkel, 1985), which may prevent the supporter
from becoming active.
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To empirically test whether party competition increases or decreases party ac-
tivism, we draw on a unique empirical setting and data source. In cooperation with
a major Western European party,2 we implemented a field experiment during a re-
cent national electoral campaign. Before the launch of the campaign, we distributed
a survey to the party’s campaign email list, which was answered by 1,417 activists.
In the survey, we randomized whether respondents were given true information
about the planned canvassing of members of the main competitor party. The infor-
mation indicated that the effort of the competitor was exceptionally high. Given
that the party we cooperated with was leading in the polls, the treatment therefore
rendered the upcoming election more competitive. The control group received no
information, leaving perceptions about competition unchanged.
Our main outcome is unobtrusive, real-time data on respondents’ canvassing be-
havior in the campaign, which we obtained through a novel canvassing smartphone
application distributed by the party. Comparing treatment to control respondents,
we find that the information made supporters significantly less likely to go canvass-
ing. Put differently, framing the election as more competitive decreased supporters’
willingness to participate in the campaign. Treated individuals were 4.6 percentage
points less likely to knock on doors during the campaign, compared to a control
group mean of 16.7 percent. This corresponds to a 30 percent reduction in the
likelihood of becoming active.
At what point during the campaign did the drop in participation materialize?
The disaggregated temporal canvassing data shows that the effect built up contin-
uously. It emerged a few weeks after the treatment was administered and became
steadily larger as the campaign progressed. Indeed, the engagement gap between
the treatment and control group was largest in the final weeks of the campaign.
This temporal pattern underscores that the observed treatment effect is not sim-
ply a short-lived empirical fluke. Rather, the manipulation meaningfully shifted
2We agreed to anonymize the name of the party and the country of study.
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behavior throughout the electoral campaign.
To corroborate that the treatment effect is driven by changes in supporters’
beliefs about the competitor’s effort, we present three pieces of evidence. First, the
survey elicited respondents’ beliefs about the canvassing behavior of the competitor
party before and after the treatment was shown. This allows us to demonstrate that
the treatment, indeed, caused respondents to update their beliefs. Second, we show
that respondents who underestimate the competitor’s effort—i.e., those who learn
that the competitor is more active than previously thought—contribute more to the
observed treatment effects than overestimators. Third, we document correlationally
that control group respondents’ beliefs about the effort of the competitor party are
negatively associated with their own engagement in the campaign. Put differently,
supporters who expect the competitor to do more, canvass less.
Why did the competition treatment lead supporters to remain inactive? To
parse out the underlying mechanism, we explore whether the drop in participation
was due to the fact that increased party competition reduced supporters’ perceived
effectiveness. Two months after the election, we therefore implemented a follow-up
survey, which was taken up by 196 party supporters. Based on this data, we confirm
that treated respondents exhibited significantly less confidence that their political
engagement will make a difference. The treatment effect is a sizable 0.27 standard
deviations and as high as 0.34 standard deviations when restricting the sample to
respondents who underestimated the competitor’s effort level.
Besides contributing to an enduring debate about electoral competition and po-
litical engagement, our study adds to a growing literature studying the determinants
of political activism in general and party activism in particular (Enos and Hersh,
2015; Hager et al., 2019; Han, 2016; Holbein, 2017; Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; White-
ley and Seyd, 2002, 1998). We add to this debate by, for the first time, providing
micro-level causal evidence combining unobtrusive behavioral data with exogenous
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variation in perceptions about party competition. Our findings demonstrate that
the decision to join a campaign is decidedly affected by effort choices of political
competitors: increasing perceived competition led party supporters to stay off the
campaign trail. This contrasts with much of the existing, mostly correlational lit-
erature which finds either positive or zero effects on political activism (Huckfeldt
et al., 2007; Lipsitz, 2009; Settle et al., 2016; Vowles et al., 2017). This contrast
highlights the need for exogenous variation in (perceptions of) party competition
to study its effects. Meanwhile, a theoretical channel that we empirically explore—
party competition lowering supporters’ perceived effectiveness—speaks to broader
evidence that links self-efficacy to political participation (Karp and Banducci, 2008;
Sloam, 2014; Vecchione and Caprara, 2009).
Theoretical framework
What explains why some party supporters join the campaign trail, while others
remain inactive? This paper revisits one potential driver of campaign participa-
tion: party competition.3 In the following, we provide a theoretical framework—
incorporating instrumental and expressive benefits of political activism—that helps
explain how party competition affects the decision to become active in a political
campaign. The theory Appendix provides a formalization of our arguments.
3A related literature studies the demographics, ideology, and personality of party activist (Enos
and Hersh, 2015; Hassell, 2019; Van Haute and Gauja, 2015). While this literature is important
to understand who becomes a party activist, it does not directly speak to how external factors or
strategic interactions influence political participation.
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Instrumental considerations
We begin by considering an instrumental account of party activism in which a
supporter4 only cares about the outcome of an electoral race between two parties.
The supporter may, for instance, want the party’s ideology or policy goals to be
implemented (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2006). In such an instrumental scenario,
the supporter only joins the campaign if she decides the election, i.e., if she is
pivotal. Since the likelihood of being pivotal is small and participation is costly
(Enos and Hersh, 2015, 254), scholars typically expect low levels of activism based
on instrumental grounds (Gerber et al., 2008; Olson, 1965). Importantly, however,
the impact of volunteering in a political campaign is orders of magnitude larger
than that of casting a ballot. A good canvasser convinces hundreds of people to
vote. In our own sample, described below, party supporters knocked on an average
of 224 doors and roughly 40 percent of local races for MP seats were close (within a
5 point margin). Party supporters’ likelihood to be pivotal—real or perceived—was
thus not trivial.
Suppose further then that the supporter’s utility gained from the election de-
pends on her own decision to participate in the campaign as well as that of members
of the competitor party. Assume that the supporter’s party has a higher ex ante
likelihood of winning the election compared to the competitor party. This was the
case in our empirical setting, where the party was polling ahead of its main competi-
tor nationally as well as sub-nationally in most constituencies. Under this scenario,
increased competitor effort affects the supporter’s decision calculus in two ways:
On one hand, holding constant the number of persuaded voters, an increase
in competitor effort increases the likelihood that the supporter is pivotal. If the
competitor steps up its game, the margin between both parties shrinks. As a result,
4We use the term “supporter” to capture all individuals that lean towards a party and could
plausibly join the campaign trail—be they members or not.
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the supporter, if active, becomes more likely to decide the election by convincing
voters to turn out for her party. Put differently, the marginal impact of every
voter convinced on the likelihood of winning the election increases. Following the
instrumental accounts developed by Downs et al. (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook
(1968), the supporter should therefore become more likely to join the campaign
when the competitor party increases its effort. A number of theoretical accounts
therefore predict that as districts become more competitive, party activism rises
(Beck and Heidemann, 2014; Godwin and Mitchell, 1982; Wolak, 2006). As Pattie
and Johnston (2003, 310) write, “[w]here one’s rivals campaign hard, there is an
extra incentive to campaign harder oneself.”
On the other hand, an increase in competitor effort implies that voters are more
likely to be exposed to campaigning from the opposing camp (Grofman et al., 1998).
Wolak (2006, 354), for instance, notes that competitive districts see greater “cam-
paign intensity [which] increases opportunities for citizens to encounter campaign
messages that captivate interest.” A rise in effort by the competitor may thus make
it harder for the supporter, if active, to persuade or mobilize voters for her own
party. After all, a pitch at the door may be less persuasive if the competitor fol-
lows up shortly after. The supporter’s goal is to persuade voters in favor of her
party, for instance, by signaling that the party cares about the voter, by selectively
emphasizing specific elements of the party’s policy platform that are of interest to
the voter, and by reducing the voter’s overall uncertainty about the party’s pol-
icy positions. All three mechanisms of persuasion may be weakened if the voter is
visited by a competing party shortly before or after.5 Increased party competition
may therefore reduce an activist’s effectiveness.6 At the same time, it is also con-
5In a similar vein, Muller and Opp (1986) suggest that an individual’s perception about the
probability that her group will succeed reinforces her sense of personal efficacy, which determines
her likelihood of participation.
6Whiteley and Seyd (1998) put forth an additional adverse instrumental channel: party sup-
porters’ participation in a campaign may be driven by the motive to hold elected office. If the
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ceivable that activists feel more effective when party competition increases because
they can counterbalance the effort of the competitor. Consequently, the effects of
competition on perceived and actual effectiveness are theoretically ambiguous and
ultimately an empirical question.7
In sum, in a purely instrumental framework, a rise in effort by the competitor
affects a supporter’s decision to join the campaign in two potentially counteracting
ways. On one hand, increased party competition makes a race tighter, which means
the supporter’s participation is more likely to make a difference. On the other hand,
increased party competition means voters are exposed to more campaigning, which
might make a supporter’s engagement more or less effective. Ex ante it is therefore
unclear whether increased competitor effort increases or decreases party activism.
Expressive benefits
As emphasized by Huddy et al. (2015), a purely instrumental account of political
activism is likely incomplete. When deciding whether to join a campaign, party sup-
porters arguably also take into consideration a number of expressive benefits (Green
et al., 2004). Marcus et al. (2000) and Huddy et al. (2007), for example, highlight
that the contextual environment in which party supporters operate can trigger dif-
ferential emotions and expressive benefits, which either increase or decrease their
non-instrumental motivation to take political action. How precisely does increased
party competition affect a supporter’s emotions and expressive motives and how
does it affect her decision to take political action?
On one hand, increased party competition may spark emotions that lead indi-
viduals to join the campaign trail. Three affective mechanisms are of particular
relevance.
party is more likely to lose an election, this will decrease a supporter’s personal career returns.
7In a formal model in the Online Appendix, we show that the sign of the effect of competitor
effort hinges on the “production function” of canvassing.
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First, increased competition poses a threat to party supporters’ group status
(Brown, 2000; Tajfel et al., 1979) and potentially triggers supporters’ need to secure
their party’s status and electoral dominance (Huddy et al., 2013; Mason, 2015). A
particularly important emotion in this context is anger. If a supporter feels that
her group status is under threat, she may experience anger and decide to become
active (Huddy et al., 2007).
Second and related, Glazer (2008) argues that political activism can be explained
on the basis of a human desire to inflict losses on competitors. In the absence of
party competition, a supporter may lack a suitable opponent and thus lack the
motivation to become active. By contrast, increased competitor effort could spark
a desire to see the competitor loose and thus inspire party supporters to take to the
streets.
Third, political activists may simply enjoy the competitive nature of politics,
where clearly identifiable groups fight for a specific goal. Greater party competition
may thus spark a feeling of enthusiasm—an emotion that has been linked to higher
political activism (Groenendyk and Banks, 2014; Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino
et al., 2011). A similar argument is made by Chong (2014, 76) who writes: “political
activists relish the competition and conflict of the political arena.”
On the other hand, increased party competition can also spark emotions that
lead individuals to abstain from the campaign trail. We describe three particularly
important affective mechanisms.
First, increased party competition may infringe upon supporters’ feeling of self-
efficacy, which has been shown to drive political engagement (Campbell et al., 1954;
Finkel, 1985; Klandermans and Stekelenburg, 2013). As conceptualized by Ryan
and Deci (2000), self-efficacy can be curtailed when external pressures due to com-
petition are present, leading to a suppression of expressive benefits (Deci et al.,
1981; Reeve and Deci, 1996; Vallerand et al., 1986). As a consequence, suppressed
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self-efficacy and expressive benefits in response to competition may ultimately in-
hibit activism. Evidence for this mechanism in the political domain is provided
by Whiteley and Seyd (1998) who document that political group- and self-efficacy
suffer among party members after a significant election loss.
Second, greater party competition may be interpreted as a threat to a supporter’s
group status and can thus provoke anxiety, which has been shown to curtail political
engagement (Huddy et al., 2007). As Huddy and Mason (2008, 3) write, “threats
(concerning for example a possible electoral defeat) could produce anxiety, leading to
a desire to withdraw from political competition.” In this regard, Settle et al. (2017)
note that supporters with high levels of negative affectivity might be particularly
likely to respond negatively to increased competition.
Third, potential activists may simply dislike the competitive nature of politics.
Greater competition could thus lower enthusiasm towards the own campaign, which
has been linked to political activism (Groenendyk and Banks, 2014; Marcus et al.,
2000; Valentino et al., 2011). A related phenomenon are bandwagon effects (Marsh,
1985; McAllister and Studlar, 1991): party supporters may be more likely to partic-
ipate in a party’s campaign if they perceive the party to be more likely to win the
election. Greater party competition implies a higher likelihood that the supporter’s
party loses the election, which may lead supporters to abstain from the campaign
trail.8
In sum, the effect of increased party competition on supporters’ expressive ben-
efits will depend on the particular non-instrumental considerations and emotions
triggered. As highlighted by Settle et al. (2017), there is likely substantial hetero-
8In an alternative reading, bandwagon effects may not be directed at the supported party’s
chances of winning but rather the total level of activism across all parties. In this case, if party
competition and the total level of activism across the political spectrum are high, potential activists
may be more likely to take political action, leading to a positive association between perceived
competition and activists’ canvassing effort.
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geneity across individuals that may be determined by biological factors, personality,
and their general inclination to participate in political activities (Arceneaux and
Nickerson, 2009; MacKuen et al., 2010; Wolak and Marcus, 2007). Or, as Huddy
et al. (2015, 10) put it: “Weakly identified fans may attend games when the team
is doing well and skip those where defeat is likely, but strong fans hang on and par-




To explore the impact of electoral competition on political activism, we implemented
a field experiment in the context of a national election in a large Western European
democracy. The country of study uses a mixed electoral system. Citizens cast two
votes. The first vote is for the MP of the local electoral district who must receive
the plurality of votes (each party can nominate one candidate). The second vote is
for a party and is proportional.9 Seats in the national parliament are given to all
winning candidates in local electoral races. The remaining seats are allocated to
preserve the proportionality of votes cast for the party (second vote).
We cooperated with one of the two main competing parties during the final
weeks of the electoral campaigns. Parties in the country of study organize their ac-
tivism at three levels. At the national-level, party headquarters are responsible for
the overall campaign strategy and program, funding as well as providing logistical
and organizational support to the grass-roots campaigns. The national headquar-
9More specifically, citizens vote for the party’s list of candidates for the national parliament;
the list is different in each federal state and decided upon by the local state’s party caucus. Only
parties that receive more than 5% of votes are taken into consideration.
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ters also take care of most advertising (including, e.g., billboards, mailings as well
as TV and radio ads). At the state-level, state party headquarters have similar
responsibilities, but at a significantly smaller scale. At the local-level, party chap-
ters are responsible for recruiting party members and supporters for the campaign.
Importantly, this includes recruiting and organizing the canvassing teams.
The party we cooperated with promoted canvassing as a new effective campaign
tool through internal communication channels as well as via the media.10 Volunteers
were instructed to systematically record canvassed doors using a novel smartphone
application. All of the country’s well over 200 constituencies saw canvassing ac-
tivity, underlining the high level of engagement. During the campaign, the party
headquarter stayed in touch with local canvassers via email, social media and tele-
phone. One unit of the party was specifically tasked with training, supporting and
motivating local canvassers.
Survey and Sample
In collaboration with the party’s canvassing unit, we designed an online survey
intended to collect information on current canvassing activity and potential road-
blocks. The email was then sent out on behalf of the party to its list of supporters
who had expressed interest in supporting the party during the electoral campaign,
i.a., by registering on a widely publicized website. In the email, the supporters
were asked to participate in the survey and informed that the answers would be
used to help organize the party’s canvassing activities. The invitation email was
designed by the party and used a standard party template. A reminder email was
sent one week after the initial invitation. Overall, 1,417 party supporters agreed to
participate. The response rate was 5.6% among all sent emails, and 16.2% among
10Although door-to-door canvassing has been a widely used campaign strategy in many coun-
tries, it had been used scarcely in the country of study and by the party we cooperated with.
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all opened emails. Importantly, participants were not aware that the data would
also be used for scientific purposes.11
The survey was brief in nature so as to minimize dropout, including just ten
questions. The survey instrument is provided in the Appendix. The first six items
measured background information. As summarized in Table A1, we inquired about
respondents’ gender (23 percent female), age (mean of 40), party membership (mean
of 82 percent), years of membership (mean of 12), prior canvassing experience (mean
of 37 percent), and attendance at campaign workshops (mean of 22 percent). In
addition, we know whether respondents had downloaded the canvassing smartphone
application (discussed below) before the survey (28 percent).
How does the supporter sample compare to the party’s full population of mem-
bers? In order to maintain anonymity, we cannot provide precise figures. Broadly
speaking, the sample matches the party’s distribution of members regarding gen-
der and geography. However, the sample is significantly younger than the average
party member. Our sample is also disproportionally engaged. It includes 12.9%
of all party supporters who canvassed for the party during the entire campaign.
Furthermore, survey respondents were responsible for 21.9% of all knocked doors
during the campaign. The sample can thus best be characterized as ‘young and
highly motivated supporters.’ This group is relevant because it includes individu-
als for whom the party could have hoped to increase engagement. Given the mild
nature of the intervention and the relatively high-effort nature of canvassing, this
sample characteristic increases our ability to detect treatment effects. Moreover,
the young age in our sample also implies that supporters did not face technological
11The party did not mention the scientific cooperation for two reasons. First, the email consti-
tuted regular contact with canvassers and thus resembled“business as usual.” Second, the scientific
cooperation with the party was subject to an agreement specifying that the data and setting would
be kept confidential. We discuss the ethical considerations of our study in the Section on ethical
considerations.
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barriers to using the smartphone application with which the party organized its
canvassing and which we used to obtain unobtrusive behavioral outcomes.
Still, we must caution that the behavior of our sample cannot be generalized to
all party members. Our study merely allows us to draw internally valid conclusions
about the strategic behavior of the party’s active supporters who were interested in
joining the campaign. This sample, however, is highly relevant. In our setting, the
majority of canvassing (and campaigning at large) was done by a relatively small
subset of motivated party supporters—individuals that took part in our survey.
Treatment
To study the effect of party competition on supporters’ decision to participate in
the campaign, we administered an information treatment to exogenously shift par-
ticipants’ beliefs about the canvassing effort of members of their main competitor
party. Figure A.1 summarizes the experimental design, which consisted of three
steps.
First, we elicited all respondents’ pre-treatment beliefs about the canvassing
intentions of the competitor party. Specifically, we asked:
“Think of 100 typical [competitor name] party members. What do you
think: How many of these 100 [competitor name] party members plan to
go canvassing in this electoral campaign?”
On average, as Table A1 documents, respondents believed that 21 percent of mem-
bers of the competitor party planned to go canvassing.
Second, we randomly assigned half of the participants to receive information
about the canvassing intentions of members of their main competitor party. Respon-
dents in the control group received no information.12 Participants in the treatment
12Table A2 in the Online Appendix shows that randomization achieved excellent balance for the
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group were shown the following treatment information that displayed the previously
stated belief of the respondent and compared it to the true figure:13
“You said [X] out of 100 [competitor name] party members. According to
a survey of [competitor name] party members, 56 out of 100 [competitor
name] party members plan to go canvassing in this electoral campaign.”
We gathered the information on canvassing intentions of the major competitor
party in a different survey, which we had administered six weeks before the main
experiment. This statistic was perceived as exceptionally high given that 89 percent
of respondents underestimated this number (see Figure A.3). As the party we
cooperated with was leading in the polls, the treatment information rendered the
race more competitive than previously thought.
Third, we elicited all respondents’ post-treatment beliefs about the actual can-
vassing effort of the competitor. This allows us to assess whether treated respon-
dents updated their post-treatment beliefs. We inquired about “actual” behavior
because we hypothesized that the actual behavior is ultimately the relevant metric
that affects the electoral outcome. Specifically, we asked:
“What do you think: How many of these 100 [competitor name] party
members will actually go canvassing during this electoral campaign?”
After eliciting respondents’ beliefs about canvassing intentions, providing the treat-
ment and eliciting the post-treatment beliefs about actual behavior, we adminis-
tered two attitudinal outcome measures. First, respondents were asked whether
they planned to go canvassing in the campaign (mean of 53 percent; see Table A1).
Second, respondents were asked how many days they planned to go canvassing
(mean of 4.1; see Table A1).
aforementioned covariates across the treatment and control group. A joint F -test from a regression
of the treatment indicator on all available pre-registered covariates is insignificant (p=0.471).
13The treatment screen also displayed the two numbers using a bar chart (depicted in Figure
A.2). This served the purpose of making the two numbers more readily accessible and comparable
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Outcome: Real-time canvassing behavior
To unobtrusively measure respondents’ canvassing behavior, we draw on unique real-
time data on actual canvassing activity collected by the party during the campaign.
The party provided a novel smartphone application to its supporters to record
knocked doors. Importantly, the party instructed and encouraged all canvassers to
download and use the app. Frequent reminders via social media and email ensured
that all active canvassers used the app. Local MPs were explicitly instructed to track
all doors in the app. The party also provided the canvassers with training workshops
in which party supporters were encouraged to use the app. To further boost take-up,
the app included a number of gamification elements (e.g., titles for individuals that
knocked many doors). Before the survey took place, 28 percent of the sample (400
supporters) had already downloaded the app. Another 80 supporters downloaded
the app after the experiment. The unobtrusive, geo-coded app data provides a
unique lens into the actual canvassing activities of respondents.14
The app data allows us to construct three behavioral outcomes: First, we con-
struct a dummy for whether respondents engaged in any canvassing in the time
from the survey until the election (average of 16 percent; see Table A1).15 This
measure captures respondents’ participation decision, i.e., whether to canvass or
not. By contrast, our second and third measure capture respondents’ effort deci-
sion conditional on participating in the campaign. The second measure involves the
number of days respondents went canvassing (average of 0.71 days; see Table A1).
As our third outcome, we measure the total number of doors respondents knocked
14Reassuringly, the sample of canvassers is fairly homogenously spread out over the country
of study. In our sample of survey respondents, we observe canvassing in 81.4% of all constituen-
cies. Furthermore, canvassing activity is evenly spread across constituencies with no constituency
containing more than 1.5% of our sample.
15Following our pre-analysis plan, individuals who do not appear in the canvassing application
data are coded as 0. We show that all results are robust to a different coding scheme in the
Robustness Section.
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on winsorized at the 99th percentile (average of 34 doors; see Table A1).16
Results
Empirical specification
To assess the impact of the information treatment, we estimate the following pre-
registered specification using ordinary least squares:17
Canvassingi = π0 + π1Treatmenti + ζ
TXi + εi
where Canvassingi is one of the measures of respondent i ’s party activism. Treatmenti
is a dummy variable taking a value of one for people who receive the information
and zero otherwise. Xi is the pre-registered set of control variables: party mem-
bership, number of years of party membership, age, gender, whether a participant
has participated in a campaign workshop, whether a participant has already down-
loaded the canvassing smartphone application, whether a participant has partic-
16One may be worried that the smartphone app affected respondents’ canvassing behavior.
We cannot, unfortunately, observe the behavior of respondents that did not download the app.
Fortunately, the party strongly encouraged everyone to use the app. The behavior recorded in
the app thus constitutes how a motivated, regular canvasser behaved. We should also reiterate
that canvassers were not aware that researchers would look at the data. This arguably diminishes
concerns about potential “observer effects” (see a more elaborate discussion in the Ethics section).
Reassuringly, in Table A4 we show that control group respondents who used the app were 134%
more likely to report an intention to go canvassing. Our sample thus likely captures the highly
active canvassers. That said, we do not know if supporters’ canvassing behavior would have been
different had the party not used the app. Given that similar apps are used by many parties across
Europe and the U.S., however, our evidence arguably captures regular canvassing behavior in
today’s political campaigns.
17Our results are robust to using logit regressions instead of ordinary least squares for binary
outcomes. Results are shown in Table A6 in the Online Appendix.
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ipated in canvassing before this national election and whether a participant has
already canvassed during this election (see Table A1 for an overview). We report
robust standard errors in all models.
Effect on canvassing behavior
Did the treatment affect respondents’ canvassing behavior? We begin by analyzing
respondents’ participation decision. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 1 show that the treat-
ment led to a significant decrease in respondents’ party activism. In the combined
sample—i.e., pooling under- and overestimators—we find that treated respondents
are 4.6 percentage points less likely to participate in the campaign. This corresponds
to a 30 percent decrease in the likelihood of becoming active. When including the
pre-registered control variables, we estimate a reduction of 3.2 percentage points.
Both estimates are highly significant: The randomization inference p-value demon-
strates that, when considering all possible treatment assignments and assuming no
effect for any individual, the probability of observing a reduction in engagement
of this magnitude (by chance) is just 1 percent.18 These findings indicate that the
treatment had a significant negative effect on respondents’ participation decision,
i.e., whether to canvass or not.
Next, we investigate respondents’ effort decision, i.e., how many days to canvass
and how many doors to knock. Here, the coefficients are noisily measured. Three
of the four reported coefficients imply that the treatment reduced respondents’ ef-
fort decision. When excluding controls (Columns 3 and 5 in Table 1), for instance,
treated individuals seemingly canvassed 0.12 fewer days (minus 16.4 percent) and
18As an additional robustness check, using the sample of participants who downloaded the
canvassing application and for whom we know their location, Table A5 controls for local political
circumstances by including a dummy variable that indicates whether the vote share difference
between the party and its strongest competitor is within five percentage points. Results are
virtually unchanged.
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Table 1: Treatment effects on behavior
Any canvassing Days canvassed Doors knocked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Without With Without With Without With
Controls Controls Controls Controls Controls Controls
Treatment -0.046∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.117 -0.044 -3.623 0.024
S.E. (0.018) (0.015) (0.146) (0.135) (7.532) (7.042)
RI p-value [0.013] [0.036] [0.422] [0.751] [0.632] [0.998]
Control mean 0.160 0.160 0.712 0.712 34.148 34.148
Observations 1,417 1,417 1,417 1,417 1,417 1,417
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Table 1 presents coefficients, robust standard errors (in parentheses) and randomiza-
tion inference based p-values (in brackets) of a linear model (OLS), regressing the indicated
behavioral outcomes on the treatment. Outcome data are obtained through a smartphone
application used by the canvassers to register knocked doors. “Any canvassing” refers to
any recorded canvassing activity. “Days canvassed” refers to the number of canvassed days.
“Doors knocked” refers to the number of knocked doors winsorized at the 99th percentile.
Odd columns display specifications without control variables. Even columns include the
following pre-specified control variables: party membership, number of years of party mem-
bership, age, gender, whether a participant has participated in a canvassing training, whether
a participant has already downloaded the online application, whether a participant has par-
ticipated in canvassing before this national election and whether a participant has canvassed
in the current election. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
knocked on 3.6 fewer doors (minus 10.6 percent). But, the estimates are not sig-
nificant. In addition, when including control variables (Columns 4 and 6 in Table
1), the estimates are very close to zero and not consistently negative. Our evidence
for respondents’ effort decision is thus inconclusive and we cannot reject the null
hypothesis.
Taken together, the pre-registered models yield robust evidence that learning
about high activism in the competitor party had a negative effect on individuals’
participation decision. We find no effect for individuals’ effort decision. These effects
suggest that ‘marginal’ activists who would have exerted relatively little canvassing
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effort left the campaign.19
Dynamics of behavioral change
At what point and for how long did the treatment change respondents’ engagement?
One concern with experimental studies are short lived treatment effects. The real-
time behavioral data at our disposal allows us to address this concern. In Figure
1 we plot the cumulative distribution of canvassing participation over the course of
the campaign as well as one standard error intervals (black lines). The dotted line
plots the treatment group, the solid line plots the control group. The treatment was
administered in week zero (red line), while the election took place in week eight.
The Figure provides three pieces of evidence. First, treatment and control re-
spondents are indistinguishable in the weeks preceding the experiment, underscoring
that differences between the treatment and control group in the weeks following the
experimental manipulation are caused by the treatment assignment. Second, there
is a continuous buildup of engagement as the election day approaches. Third and
most important, the treatment group—starting a few weeks after the randomized in-
formation provision—shows significantly lower levels of engagement. Furthermore,
the gap between both groups widens at a roughly constant rate as the campaign pro-
gresses.20 The continuous build-up of the effect thus underscores that the treatment
had a pronounced and persistent effect on respondents’ party activism.21 The tem-
19For the sake of brevity, we report pre-registered heterogeneity analyses in the heterogeneity
section of the Appendix.
20We attribute the lack of significant differences early on in the campaign to reduced power
due to lower levels of canvassing activity.
21Two factors may contribute to the persistent and long-lasting effect of our information treat-
ment. First, the information was provided through official party channels, which likely made the
information salient and credible and thus produced a long-lasting impression on participants. Sec-
ond, the information about canvassing intentions of the competitor party was 167% above what
the average supporter believed. The impact of the treatment on respondents’ beliefs was thus
20
poral pattern also holds when controlling time-invariant individual characteristics
(see Figure A.5).
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One standard error interval
Notes: Figure 1 plots the raw fraction of respondents who participated in the
canvassing campaign for any given week for the treatment group (dotted line)
and the control group (solid line). The black vertical lines are one standard error
intervals. The red vertical line indicates the timing of the treatment. The election
took place in week eight. No control variables are included.
Robustness
Before turning to the mechanisms underlying the treatment effect, we provide two
pieces of robustness regarding our outcome measure.
First, following our pre-analysis plan, we have coded respondents that did not
use the app as not having canvassed.22 If some of these respondents did canvass,
large, which helps explain its lasting effect.
22NB: we pre-registered and use the full survey sample—rather than the app user sample
only—in order to avoid post-treatment bias, which would arise if the treatment had affected app
downloads.
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we classify them incorrectly and thus add measurement error to our outcome vari-
able. This measurement error, however, is not problematic given that imputing zero
canvassing for individuals without the application should attenuate the estimated
treatment effect. The reported treatment effects thus represents a lower bound.
Still, to further mitigate concerns regarding this imputation, Table A5 presents
our main model excluding respondents that did not download the app or who did
not register a valid location. Reassuringly, the results confirm our treatment effect
which, if anything, becomes larger.
Second, one may be worried that the treatment affected uptake of the app dif-
ferentially across the treatment and control group. Reassuringly, a large fraction
of party supporters had already downloaded the app before the survey was fielded.
This makes it unlikely that the treatment changed app download behavior. We
confirm this conjecture in Table A3. Specifically, we find a zero-effect on individ-
uals’ likelihood to click on a link within the survey that took respondents to the
App/ Android store to download the app. Furthermore, we also find no evidence on
differential app download between the treatment and control group after the survey
(neither for the 24h time window after the survey, one week after the survey, or any
time after the survey).23
23As a further piece of robustness, we discuss the possibility of demand effects in the demand
effects section of the appendix. Specifically, we investigate the effect of our treatment on two
self-reported measures of respondents’ intentions to go canvassing. We do not find a significant
negative treatment effect on these self-reported outcomes. If anything, there is a slight positive
effect (though the coefficient is insignificant without control variables). This short-term effect may
be a product of social pressure induced by the surveyor as respondents might want to please the
party by showing a higher willingness to engage in the campaign. The inconclusive finding thus,
if anything, underscores the methodological necessity to collect unobtrusive behavioral data.
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Mechanisms
Why did the competition treatment reduce party activism? In this section, we
explore two mechanisms. First, we probe whether the treatment reduced party
engagement by changing respondents’ beliefs about the competitor party’s effort.
Second, we test for the potential mechanism that increased party competition re-
duces activism by rendering an activist’s engagement less effective.
Beliefs about competitor effort
Did the treatment change respondents’ behavior by changing their beliefs about
the competitor party’s effort? We provide three pieces of evidence in favor of this
channel.
First, the treatment did indeed shift respondents’ post-treatment beliefs about
competing canvassers’ behavior. Figure A.4 shows the difference between post- and
pre-treatment beliefs across all participants in the control and treatment group. We
observe that underestimators in the treatment group update positively relative to
the control group underestimators. The reverse holds for overestimators (a formal
test is provided in Table A7).
Second, as a qualification for beliefs as a causal channel we would expect under-
estimators to drive the treatment effects. Put differently, relative to overestimators,
underestimators should canvass less as they learn about greater effort by the com-
petitor. To test this empirically, in Table A8 we interact the treatment with a
dummy for overestimation. Unfortunately, the sample includes very few overesti-
mators (11 percent). We therefore lack the statistical power to reliably estimate
differences between the two groups. With that said, Table A8 does show a positive
interaction between the treatment and overestimation, suggesting that the results
are driven by underestimators. However, due to the lack of statistical power, the
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estimate should be interpreted with caution.
A third way to assess the importance of beliefs about competitor effort—though
not causally identified—is to correlate control respondents’ posterior belief about
competitor effort with their canvassing behavior. Table A13 demonstrates that con-
trol respondents’ beliefs correlate negatively with their canvassing behavior. Put
simply, individuals expecting the competitor to do more, canvass less. The cor-
relation is significant for all three behavioral measures. Moreover, the models are
robust to the inclusion of the pre-registered control variables. The analysis thus
lends further empirical support that beliefs are a plausible channel through which
the treatment affected respondents’ political activism.
Reduced perceived effectiveness
Did the treatment reduce respondents’ activism by making canvassers feel less ef-
fective? To test this mechanism, we investigate whether the treatment, indeed,
changed activists’ perceptions about their effectiveness. To measure perceptions
about campaign effectiveness, we conducted a follow-up survey with the same pool
of party supporters two months after the election. We reached 196 respondents.
While this number is low, there is no evidence that there was differential selection
into the second survey: First, the original treatment status does not predict partici-
pation in the post-election survey (Tables A9 and A10). Second, the treatment and
control group in the post-election survey are balanced on pre-determined covariates
(Tables A11 and A12).
To measure whether treated respondents felt less effective, we asked to what
extent they agreed with the following statement: “You can change political cir-
cumstances by becoming politically active.” Answers were scored on a seven-point
Likert-scale from ‘do not agree at all’ to ‘fully agree.’ We standardize this variable
to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Table 2 shows that treated
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respondents show a significantly lower level of perceived effectiveness. The treat-
ment effect is a substantively sizable 0.25 standard deviations. When we restrict
the sample to underestimators—respondents who initially underestimated the com-
petitor’s effort level and learned that the competition will do more—the estimated
effect size increases to 0.31 standard deviations. The large reduction in activists’
perceptions about their ability to drive political change, detected two months after
the election, provides suggestive evidence that increased party competition, indeed,
lowered activists’ perceived effectiveness and thereby dampened engagement.
Table 2: Treatment effects on perceived effectiveness
Ability to make political change
Pooled sample Underestimators
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Without With Without With
Controls Controls Controls Controls
Treatment -0.273∗ -0.245∗ -0.339∗∗ -0.314∗∗
(0.143) (0.145) (0.149) (0.151)
Control mean 0.131 0.131 0.150 0.150
Observations 196 196 180 180
Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: Table 2 presents coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of a linear
model (OLS), regressing our measure of perceived effectiveness on the treatment for indi-
viduals who responded to the post-election survey. Columns 1 and 2 present the estimates
for the full sample. Columns 3 and 4 present estimates for underestimators. Perceived
effectiveness is measured using respondents’ agreement to the statement: “You can change
political circumstances by becoming politically active.” Answers were scored on a seven-point
Likert-scale ranging from ‘do not agree at all’ to ‘fully agree.’ The outcome is standard-
ized. Pre-specified control variables include: party membership, number of years of party
membership, age, gender, whether a participant has participated in a canvassing training,
whether a participant has already downloaded the online application, whether a participant
has participated in canvassing before this national election and whether a participant has
canvassed in the current election. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Substitution to other effort domains
We provided robust evidence that increased party competition leads the supporters
of a political party to shy away from canvassing. This evidence raises an important
follow-up question: did party supporters abstain from the campaign entirely or did
they merely shift their effort to other modes of campaigning? Canvassing is one of
the most effective forms of campaigning (Green et al., 2013). But perhaps a rise in
competitor effort on the streets leads party supporters to choose new channels to
contribute to the campaign? This may be particularly relevant if canvassers want
to avoid fierce competition.
To test for this substitution effect, we use a second feature of the canvassing app.
In particular, the app also gave party supporters an opportunity to share party news
stories on Facebook. As shown in Tables A14 and A15, we find small and insignif-
icant treatment effects on activism on social media. Treated respondents were no
more likely to share stories about the party on Facebook. The evidence thus implies
that treated individuals did not shift their effort toward other forms of campaigning,
in this case, social media. Rather, they abstained from any engagement.
Ethical considerations
Field experiments are an excellent method for drawing causal inferences. But they
also raise tough ethical questions because researchers intervene in (rather than ob-
serve) the real world. In our case, ethical considerations were particularly pressing
because our study could have had an impact on the election. We therefore carefully
considered the ethical dimension of our study which we want to discuss before con-
cluding. While we obtained ethical approval at the University of Oxford, we still
want to reflect on two particular ethical issues: potential effects on the election and
subjects’ non-information about participation in an experiment.
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First, implementing the survey meant that we intervened in an electoral cam-
paign. Were we justified in doing so? Importantly, the survey among party sup-
porters would have taken place with or without our presence. The party regularly
engages its supporters using emails, surveys and phone calls. We simply advised
the party on how to best implement the survey. The ultimate decision to launch the
survey, however, was made by party officials. There was also no power differential,
which could have led the party to feel obligated to implement the survey. At the
time, all authors were graduate students and the party is one of Europe’s largest
with a highly professional team of campaigners.
Second and related, the expected sample size meant that it was exceedingly
unlikely for the study to have any effect on the election. Today, we know that this
calculation was correct. Controlling for pre-specified covariates, we do not find any
aggregate impact on doors (column (6) Table 1). Even if we take the results without
controls, the treatment group knocked on 3.6 fewer doors. Assuming a persuasion
rate of 10 percent based on Pons (2018), this means that the experiment lowered
the party’s number of votes by 258. This means not a single constituency would
have elected a different candidate had the study not taken place. The national
share of the party was also entirely unaffected (up to the 04ths. digit). All this is
not to say that the survey was without any effect. We did, after all, intervene in
the real world. But it strikes us that the scientific insights—presented above—were
sufficiently high to justify our intervention.
Third, the survey did not deceive subjects. Party supporters were provided
with truthful information about the effort of the main competitor. If anything, the
study thus provided a public good to party supporters. Study participants—who
were contacted online—were also entirely free in their decision to participate in the
study. The party did not, however, inform subjects that the data would also be
used for scientific purposes. This non-information worked in our favor by preserving
the natural field setting “where the environment is one where the subjects [...] do
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not know that they are in an experiment” (Harrison and List, 2004, p. 1014). That
said, we hope that i) by avoiding any harm, ii) by allowing subjects to freely choose
to participate, and iii) by maintaining the confidentiality of all subjects including
the party and country, we were justified to stomach this non-information (decided
upon by the party) in order to explore an important question in political science.
Conclusion
This paper has provided evidence that increased party competition makes party
supporters less likely to join the campaign trail. We conducted a field experiment
with a major European party during a recent national electoral campaign. In the
experiment, party supporters where randomly assigned to true information about
the canvassing intentions of members of the major competitor party. The informa-
tion indicated that the canvassing effort by the competitor party was exceptionally
high. Given that the party we cooperated with was leading in the polls, the treat-
ment therefore increased the perceived competitiveness of the upcoming election.
Using unobtrusive, real-time data on respondents’ canvassing behavior, we found
that treated respondents are five percentage points less likely to go canvassing.
We also provide suggestive evidence as to why activists reduced their engagement:
increased competition meant that activists felt less effective.
A natural follow-up question is whether our main finding generalizes to the
broader population (Van Haute and Gauja, 2015). To address generalizability, we
therefore compared our sample to a general population panel survey in the country
of study. Relative to an equal split of men and women in the general population
(49% men), our sample is predominantly male with only 23% women. With an
average age of 40, our sample is also much younger relative to the average age
in the population. Finally, we also note that our sample’s respondents below the
median age are 0.1 SD more likely to believe that social and political activism
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influences societal conditions. Given that men in the general population are 5%-
points more likely to support a party and also exhibit a significantly higher interest
in politics (+ 0.39 SD), our sample thus likely captures highly active and interested
party supporters. Taken together, these statistics indicate that a general population
sample might likely be less responsive to changes in political competition.
A second and related question is whether our main outcome—engagement in a
canvassing campaign—generalize to other forms of political activism as well as to
different types of electoral systems. Reassuringly, we found that there are no sub-
stitution effects to online campaigning. This makes it plausible that the treatment
led potential supporters to abstain from any campaign engagement. We cannot
answer, however, whether the treatment would have worked differently in other
electoral systems. Fortunately, the country of study uses a mixed electoral system.
There is thus hope that the results apply under both proportional and majoritarian
representation. But further evidence is necessary to settle this question.
With these questions in mind, we want to conclude our study with a word on
normative implications. If political activists reduce their engagement when com-
petition increases, what does this mean for the democratic political process? If
taken at face value, our finding implies that fierce competition may not help spur
democratic engagement. Perhaps citizens prefer a more consensual, communicative
political process (Habermas, 1985). Given that politics is not, or at least should
not be, a zero-sum-game, excessive campaign effort by one party may thus do more
harm than good in terms of fostering political engagement.
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Table A1: Summary statistics
Mean Min. Max. Obs.
Covariates:
Female 0.23 0 1 1,417
Age (#) 40.17 16 99 1,417
Party member 0.82 0 1 1,417
Years of membership (#) 11.57 0 60 1,417
Experienced canvasser 0.37 0 1 1,417
Participated in workshop 0.22 0 1 1,417
Downloaded app 0.28 0 1 1,417
Prior belief about competitor 21.32 0 100 1,417
Survey outcomes:
Posterior belief about competitor 17.91 0 100 1,406
Planned canvassing 0.53 0 1 1,402
Planned days (#) 4.13 0 60 1,402
Behavioral outcomes:
Any canvassing 0.14 0 1 1,417
Cavassed days (#) 0.65 0 32 1,417
Canvassed doors (#) 32.36 0 1,045 1,417
Notes: Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample. Variables are
given in percent, unless stated otherwise.
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Table A2: Balance tests
Treatment Control P-value
(T = C)
Female 0.23 0.23 0.970
Age 40.44 39.92 0.604
Is party member 0.81 0.84 0.120
Years of party membership 11.72 11.43 0.698
Has experience canvassing 0.37 0.38 0.664
Participated in canvassing workshop 0.21 0.22 0.853
Downloaded app before survey 0.27 0.30 0.182
Has canvassed before survey 0.09 0.10 0.410
Days canvassed before survey 0.25 0.28 0.685
Doors visited before survey 10.20 11.06 0.892
Prior belief: competition 20.39 22.23 0.139
Notes: Table A2 presents all available pre-treatment covariates across the
treatment and control group, the p-value is based on a t-test comparing the
difference-in-means between the two groups. A regression of the treatment in-
dicator on all covariates yields an insignificant p-value for the F-test of joint
significance of 0.471.
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Table A3: Treatment effects on app download
Survey App Data
click on within within any time
app-link 24h one week after survey
Treatment 0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
Observations 1,417 1,417 1,417 1,417
Control group mean 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.06
Notes: Table A3 presents coefficients and robust standard errors (in
parentheses) of a linear model (OLS), regressing all outcome variables
related to app-download on the treatment dummy for the full sample.
Treatment effects are obtained conditional on pre-specified control vari-
ables: party membership, number of years of party membership, age,
gender, whether a participant has participated in canvassing training,
whether a participant has already downloaded the online application,
whether a participant has participated in canvassing before this national
election and whether a participant has canvassed in the current election.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table A4: Charcteristics of app users
App No App P-value(App = No App)
Female 0.22 0.24 0.510
Age 33.18 43.65 0.000
Is party member 0.89 0.81 0.003
Years of party membership 7.95 13.36 0.000
Has experience canvassing 0.46 0.33 0.000
Participated in door-to-door workshop 0.36 0.14 0.000
Belief: competition intentions 19.70 23.63 0.029
Belief: competition actual 13.46 16.40 0.044
Canvassing: yes 0.82 0.35 0.000
Canvassing: days 6.83 2.47 0.000
Notes: Table A4 presents differences between respondents who downloaded the app (256
supporters) and respondents who never downloaded the app (462 supporters) in the control
group. p-values are based on robust standard errors.
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Table A5: Treatment effects on behavior with additional
controls - app user sample
Any canvassing Days canvassed Door knocked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Without With Without With Without With
Controls Controls Controls Controls Controls Controls
Treatment -0.091∗∗ -0.080∗ -0.126 0.018 0.317 7.579
(0.046) (0.044) (0.421) (0.417) (21.833) (21.545)
Control mean 0.462 0.462 2.052 2.052 98.466 98.466
Observations 465 465 465 465 465 465
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Table A5 presents coefficients, robust standard errors (in parentheses) and ran-
domization inference based p-values (in brackets) of a linear model (OLS), regressing the
indicated behavioral outcomes on the treatment dummy for the sample with valid location
data (97% of people that downloaded the application). Columns 1, 3, and 5 show the spec-
ification without control variables. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include all pre-specified control
variables and a measure of marginality of the district (a dummy whether the vote share
difference between the party and its strongest competitor is within five percentage points).
Outcome data are obtained through a smartphone application used by the canvassers to
register knocked doors. “Any canvassing” refers to any recorded canvassing activity. “Days
canvassed” refers to the number of canvassed days. “Doors knocked” refers to the number of
knocked doors winsorized at the 99th percentile. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Marginal effect at mean -0.046 -0.028
Control mean 0.160 0.160
Observations 1417 1417
Controls No Yes
Notes: Table A6 presents coefficients of logit estimation with robust standard errors in
parentheses. In columns 1 and 2 we estimate a logit regression of a dummy indicating any
canvassing on the treatment dummy. Column 1 shows the specification without control
variables. Column 2 includes all pre-specified control variables. Outcome data are obtained
through a smartphone application used by the canvassers to register knocked doors. “Any
canvassing” refers to any recorded canvassing activity. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table A7: Impact on post-treatment beliefs
Full sample Underestimators Overestimators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Without With Without With Without With
Controls Controls Controls Controls Controls Controls
Treatment 5.193∗∗∗ 5.091∗∗∗ 7.898∗∗∗ 7.796∗∗∗ -15.134∗∗∗ -15.716∗∗∗
(0.954) (0.946) (0.730) (0.725) (3.452) (3.598)
Control mean 15.354 15.354 10.389 10.389 56.429 56.429
Observations 1406 1406 1261 1261 145 145
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Table A7 presents coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses)
of a linear model (OLS), regressing the posterior beliefs on the treatment dummy.
Columns (1) and (2) display the results for all respondents. Columns (3) and (4)
display results for respondents who underestimated the information provided on com-
peting party members’ canvassing intentions. Columns (5) and (6) display results
for respondents who underestimated the information provided on competing party
members’ canvassing intentions. Pre-specified control variables include: party mem-
bership, number of years of party membership, age, gender, whether a participant has
participated in a canvassing training, whether a participant has already downloaded
the online application, whether a participant has participated in canvassing before
this national election and whether a participant has canvassed in the current election.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table A8: Heterogeneity by pre-treatment belief
Any canvassing Days canvassed Door knocked
Without With Without With Without With
Controls Controls Controls Controls Controls Controls
Treatment -0.048∗∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.136 -0.071 -5.214 -1.968
(0.020) (0.017) (0.161) (0.149) (8.043) (7.491)
Over-estimator -0.063∗ -0.039 -0.419∗∗ -0.305∗ -14.742 -8.482
(0.038) (0.030) (0.194) (0.169) (15.238) (14.000)
Treatment × Over-estimator 0.016 0.020 0.161 0.246 14.850 19.294
(0.051) (0.045) (0.284) (0.278) (22.694) (21.210)
Effect on over-estimator -0.031 -0.014 0.025 0.175 9.636 17.326
(0.047) (0.042) (0.235) (0.234) (21.221) (19.940)
Control mean 0.160 0.160 0.712 0.712 34.148 34.148
Observations 1,417 1,417 1,417 1,417 1,417 1,417
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Table A8 presents coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of
a linear model (OLS), regressing the indicated outcomes on the treatment interacted
with a dummy for overestimation. Pre-specified control variables include: party mem-
bership, number of years of party membership, age, gender, whether a participant has
participated in a canvassing training, whether a participant has already downloaded
the online application, whether a participant has participated in canvassing before
this national election and whether a participant has canvassed in the current election.
The sample is restricted to the control group. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Control mean 0.143 0.143
Observations 1,406 1,406
Controls No Yes
Notes: Table A9 presents coefficients and robust standard
errors (in parentheses) of a linear model (OLS), regressing a
dummy capturing participation in the post-election survey
on the treatment dummy. Pre-specified control variables
include: party membership, number of years of party mem-
bership, age, gender, whether a participant has participated
in a canvassing training, whether a participant has already
downloaded the online application, whether a participant
has participated in canvassing before this national election
and whether a participant has canvassed in the current elec-
tion. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Control mean 0.148 0.148
Observations 1,261 1,261
Controls No Yes
Notes: Table A10 presents coefficients and robust standard
errors (in parentheses) of a linear model (OLS), regressing a
dummy capturing participation in the post-election survey
on the treatment dummy. Pre-specified control variables
include: party membership, number of years of party mem-
bership, age, gender, whether a participant has participated
in a canvassing training, whether a participant has already
downloaded the online application, whether a participant
has participated in canvassing before this national election
and whether a participant has canvassed in the current elec-
tion. The sample is restricted to underestimators. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table A11: Balance in post-election survey
Treatment Control P-value
(T = C)
Female 0.18 0.25 0.274
Age 44.74 42.43 0.426
Is party member 0.85 0.84 0.878
Years of party membership 14.89 13.06 0.414
Has experience canvassing 0.45 0.45 0.954
Participated in door-to-door workshop 0.31 0.25 0.408
Downloaded app before survey 0.36 0.32 0.576
Has canvassed before survey 0.09 0.12 0.452
Days canvassed before survey 0.21 0.21 0.964
Doors visited before survey 2.31 3.66 0.612
Prior belief: competition 18.55 20.14 0.587
Notes: Table A11 presents all available covariates across the treatment and
control group in the post-election survey, which was implemented two months
after the election. We report the full sample. The p-value is based on a t-test
comparing the difference-in-means between the two groups. A regression of
the treatment indicator on all covariates yields an insignificant p-value for the
F-test of joint significance of 0.801.
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Table A12: Balance in post-election survey (underestimators)
Treatment Control P-value
(T = C)
Female 0.20 0.22 0.674
Age 44.41 42.14 0.452
Is party member 0.85 0.85 0.967
Years of party membership 15.22 12.90 0.316
Has experience canvassing 0.48 0.45 0.689
Participated in door-to-door workshop 0.31 0.26 0.387
Downloaded app before survey 0.35 0.32 0.675
Has canvassed before survey 0.08 0.12 0.426
Days canvassed before survey 0.22 0.21 0.960
Doors visited before survey 2.51 3.93 0.625
Prior belief: competition 13.88 16.11 0.293
Notes: Table A12 presents all available covariates across the treatment and con-
trol group in the post-election survey, which was implemented two months after
the election. We report the underestimator sample. The p-value is based on a
t-test comparing the difference-in-means between the two groups. A regression
of the treatment indicator on all covariates yields an insignificant p-value for
the F-test of joint significance of 0.767.
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Table A13: Correlation between canvassing behavior and beliefs about com-
petitor effort (control group)
Any canvassing Days canvassed Door knocked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Without With Without With Without With
Controls Controls Controls Controls Controls Controls
Posterior belief -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.671∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.165) (0.149)
Control mean 0.160 0.160 0.712 0.712 34.148 34.148
Observations 714 714 714 714 714 714
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Table A13 presents coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of
a linear model (OLS), regressing the indicated behavioral outcomes on control group
respondents’ beliefs about the share of competitor party members who will go canvassing
during the campaign (posterior belief). Pre-specified control variables include: party
membership, number of years of party membership, age, gender, whether a participant
has participated in a canvassing training, whether a participant has already downloaded
the online application, whether a participant has participated in canvassing before this
election and whether a participant has canvassed in the current election. The sample is
restricted to the control group. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table A14: Effects on social media activity
Shared social media message
Any Days Total
Treatment -0.004 0.130 0.297
(0.012) (0.115) (0.222)
Control mean 0.075 0.306 0.703
Observations 1417 1417 1417
Notes: Table A14 presents treatment effects on social media activity. “Any” takes value one
if the respondent shares any party news story on Facebook through the application. “Days”
denotes the total number of days a respondent shares a party news story on Facebook through
the application. “Total” is the total number of party news stories shared by the respondent
on Facebook through the application. Treatment effects are obtained conditional on pre-
specified control variables: party membership, number of years of party membership, age,
gender, whether a participant has participated in canvassing training, whether a participant
has already downloaded the online application, whether a participant has participated in
canvassing before this national election and whether a participant has canvassed in the
current election. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table A15: Effects on social media activity (underestimators only)
Shared social media message
Any Days Total
Treatment -0.004 0.132 0.295
(0.013) (0.123) (0.242)
Control mean 0.078 0.329 0.750
Observations 1271 1271 1271
Notes: Table A15 presents treatment effects on social media activity for respondents who
underestimate the share of competitor party members who plan to participate in the party’s
door-to-door canvassing campaign. “Any” takes value one if the respondent shares any party
news story on Facebook through the application. “Days” denotes the total number of days
a respondent shares a party news story on Facebook through the application. “Total” is
the total number of party news stories shared by the respondent on Facebook through the
application. Treatment effects are obtained conditional on pre-specified control variables:
party membership, number of years of party membership, age, gender, whether a participant
has participated in canvassing training, whether a participant has already downloaded the
online application, whether a participant has participated in canvassing before this national




Figure A.1: Experimental design
Experimental
assignment
(N = 1, 417)
Elicitation: Beliefs about
planned canvassing effort of
competitor party members
Elicitation: Beliefs about
planned canvassing effort of
competitor party members
Treatment: Information about
planned canvassing effort of
competitor party members
Elicitation: Beliefs about
actual canvassing effort of
competitor party members
Elicitation: Beliefs about







Actual participation in campaign
Measurement through app:
Actual participation in campaign
Treatment (N = 699)Control (N = 718)
End of survey
Notes: Figure A.1 illustrates the experimental design.
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Figure A.2: Treatment screen
Notes: Figure A.2 displays an exemplary treatment screen for a respondent who beliefs
that 32 percent of members of the competitor party will go canvassing.
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Prior beliefs about competitors
Notes: Figure A.3 shows a histogram of pre-treatment beliefs about the fraction of competi-
tor party members who plan to go canvassing. The vertical red line (56 percent) corresponds
to the treatment information.
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pre-treatment beliefs
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95% CI Kernel density estimate
Notes: Figure A.4 shows average difference between post- beliefs and pre-treatment
beliefs the fraction of members of the competitor party who plan to go canvassing
in the treatment and control group. The vertical line (56 percent) corresponds to
the true treatment information, which is based on survey evidence. Respondents are
grouped according to treatment beliefs in six bins. Respondents who underestimate
the treatment information are grouped in quartiles. Respondents who underestimate
the treatment information are grouped in below and above median pre-treatment
beliefs.
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Notes: Figure A.5 plots the treatment effects on any canvassing over time using a
difference-in-differences specification that controls for individual fixed effects. The
sample is restricted to underestimators. The black vertical lines indicate 95% con-
fidence intervals. The vertical red line indicates the timing of the treatment. The
election took place in week eight.
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Heterogeneity
Did the treatment yield greater behavioral changes among specific subgroups? To
streamline the heterogeneity analysis, we focus on treatment-by-covariate interac-
tions for respondents’ participation decision. Using the covariate data at our dis-
posal, this allows us to scrutinize eight subgroups. Four of these subgroups were
pre-registered: respondents that had downloaded the app (Table A16), respondents
with prior canvassing experience (Table A17), respondents that are party members
(Table A18), and respondents’ years of membership (Table A19). For the sake of
completeness, we report the effect of all potential interactions on the participation
decision in Table A20.
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Table A16: Treatment effects (app heterogeneity)
Posterior Intentions App Data
Belief Any Days Any Days Door
Panel A: No
app download
Treatment 5.119∗∗∗ 0.043 0.158 -0.017 -0.031 -3.076
(1.146) (0.027) (0.338) (0.011) (0.068) (3.696)
Control mean 16.454 0.384 2.722 0.044 0.143 7.484
Observations 1,009 1,006 1,006 1,017 1,017 1,017
Panel B: App
download
Treatment 5.513∗∗∗ 0.037 0.975 -0.065 0.007 12.961
(1.667) (0.034) (0.833) (0.047) (0.444) (23.072)
Control mean 12.750 0.839 7.087 0.435 2.051 96.944
Observations 397 396 396 400 400 400
Notes: Table A16 presents coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses)
of a linear model (OLS), regressing all available outcome variables on the treatment
dummy for the indicated sample. Treatment effects are obtained conditional on pre-
specified control variables: party membership, number of years of party membership,
age, gender, whether a participant has participated in canvassing training, whether a
participant has participated in canvassing before this national election and whether
a participant has canvassed in the current election. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table A17: Treatment effects (experience heterogeneity)
Posterior Intentions App Data
Belief Any Days Any Days Door
Panel A: Inexperienced
supporters
Treatment 6.114∗∗∗ 0.012 0.560∗ -0.030 -0.012 1.944
(1.240) (0.027) (0.335) (0.018) (0.142) (7.577)
Control mean 15.090 0.407 2.736 0.130 0.487 23.785
Observations 881 877 877 888 888 888
Panel B: Experienced
supporters
Treatment 3.767∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ -0.071 -0.036 -0.048 -1.735
(1.468) (0.036) (0.675) (0.028) (0.271) (13.921)
Control mean 15.786 0.701 6.097 0.210 1.081 51.140
Observations 525 525 525 529 529 529
Notes: Table A17 presents coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of a
linear model (OLS), regressing all available outcome variables on the treatment dummy for
the indicated sample. Treatment effects are obtained conditional on pre-specified control
variables: party membership, number of years of party membership, age, gender, whether
a participant has participated in canvassing training, whether a participant has already
downloaded the online application, whether a participant has participated in canvassing
before this national election and whether a participant has canvassed in the current election.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table A18: Treatment effects (membership heterogeneity)
Posterior Intentions App Data
Belief Any Days Any Days Door
Panel A: No member
Treatment 1.777 -0.067 -0.478 0.009 0.051 -0.810
(2.551) (0.052) (0.598) (0.031) (0.158) (8.978)
Control mean 18.609 0.381 2.929 0.078 0.267 15.948
Observations 246 244 244 251 251 251
Panel B: Party member
Treatment 5.757∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.584 -0.041∗∗ -0.065 0.220
(1.013) (0.024) (0.391) (0.018) (0.160) (8.360)
Control mean 14.730 0.545 4.223 0.176 0.797 37.654
Observations 1,160 1,158 1,158 1,166 1,166 1,166
Notes: Table A18 presents coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of a
linear model (OLS), regressing all available outcome variables on the treatment dummy
for the indicated sample. Treatment effects are obtained conditional on pre-specified
control variables: party membership, number of years of party membership, age, gender,
whether a participant has participated in canvassing training, whether a participant has
already downloaded the online application, whether a participant has participated in
canvassing before this national election and whether a participant has canvassed in the
current election. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table A19: Treatment effects (membership years heterogeneity)
Posterior Intentions App Data
Belief Any Days Any Days Door
Panel A: Below
med. membership dur.
Treatment 6.714∗∗∗ -0.001 0.268 -0.040 0.088 5.724
(1.288) (0.030) (0.449) (0.024) (0.222) (11.577)
Control mean 14.561 0.570 4.503 0.206 0.873 43.285
Observations 737 735 735 744 744 744
Panel B: Above
med. membership dur.
Treatment 3.391∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.430 -0.027 -0.161 -5.434
(1.394) (0.032) (0.487) (0.019) (0.158) (8.063)
Control mean 16.237 0.463 3.478 0.109 0.531 23.932
Observations 669 667 667 673 673 673
Notes: Table A19 presents coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of a
linear model (OLS), regressing all available outcome variables on the treatment dummy
for the indicated sample. Treatment effects are obtained conditional on pre-specified
control variables: party membership, number of years of party membership, age, gender,
whether a participant has participated in canvassing training, whether a participant has
already downloaded the online application, whether a participant has participated in
canvassing before this national election and whether a participant has canvassed in the
current election. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table A20: Treatment effect heterogeneity
Any canvassing
Treatment -0.027 -0.067∗ 0.009 -0.048∗∗ -0.031∗ -0.019 -0.032∗∗ -0.017 0.025
(0.018) (0.039) (0.031) (0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.048)
T × Female -0.021 -0.026
(0.037) (0.037)
T × Age 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
T × Member -0.050 -0.070∗
(0.036) (0.041)
T × Membership 0.001 0.002
years (0.001) (0.001)
T × Experience -0.004 -0.000
(0.033) (0.038)
T × Canvassing -0.062 -0.051
workshop (0.048) (0.051)
T × Has canvassed -0.005 0.064
this election (0.084) (0.102)
T × Downloaded -0.055 -0.050
app before survey (0.048) (0.058)
R-squared 0.284 0.285 0.285 0.285 0.284 0.286 0.284 0.285 0.289
Observations 1,417 1,417 1,417 1,417 1,417 1,417 1,417 1,417 1,417
Notes: Table A20 presents coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of a linear model
(OLS), regressing the indicated behavioral outcome (any canvassing) on the treatment dummy
interacted with the indicated covariates for the full sample. Treatment effects are obtained condi-
tional on pre-specified control variables: party membership, number of years of party membership,
age, gender, whether a participant has participated in canvassing training, whether a participant
has already downloaded the online application, whether a participant has participated in canvass-





How does party competition affect a party supporter’s decision to become politically
active? To structure our thinking, consider a potential activist i whose utility
depends on the outcome of an election with two competing parties. The utility
gained from the election is a function of the number of votes v(·), which is described
by g(v(di +d−i, cd)). g(·) determines how effective votes are in winning the election
or reaching the political outcome. The vote share for i’s party, v(di + d−i, cd),
depends on her canvassing effort level, di ≥ 0, the effort of other activists in i’s party
(d−i), as well as the canvassing level of the competitor party cd. We further allow
for expressive utility k(di, cd) which captures non-instrumental benefits. Finally, we
include individual-specific fixed costs of engaging in any canvassing c̃i, which are
distributed according to F , and continuous costs as a function of canvassing effort
c(di). Following this simple setup, activist i’s utility can be expressed as follows:
ui(di, d−i, cd) = g (v(di + d−i, cd)) + k(di, cd)− c(di)− c̃i1(di > 0) (1)
Canvassing effort choice
Conditional on participating in canvassing, i chooses the canvassing effort according
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From equation 2 we see that i’s effort choice depends on the marginal utility
gained from vote shares, the effectiveness of her canvassing actions in gaining ad-
ditional vote shares, and on her expressive benefits. To classify the response to an
increase in competition, we consider the following high-level assumptions.
1. Rational: people care about winning the election.
2. Effectiveness: canvassing gains you votes.
3. Concavity: the marginal utility of additional vote shares is decreasing. This
corresponds to the assumption that the party is ahead in the polls (which
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was the case in our setting). Furthermore, the marginal impact on voter
persuasion decreases in each additional unit of canvassing effort.
4. Change in effectiviness: canvassing by the opposing party changes the effec-
tiveness of one’s own canvassing.
5. Expressive motives: competition can either increase or decrease the expressive
value of own canvassing.
6. Self-limiting expressive motives: own canvassing does not increase the expres-
sive value of further own canvassing. If that were not the case, canvassers
might motivate themselves to knock on infinitely many doors.
With these assumptions and implicit differentiation we get an ambiguous theoretical
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The denominator is unambiguously negative, which means that the sign of the
enumerator determines the nature of the strategic interactions. If instrumental mo-
tives do not play a role, it is only the nature of expressive motives that determines
the whether competition increases or decreases canvassing activity. If instrumental
concerns do play a role, the closeness and reduced effectiveness effects also play a
role in determining the sign of the interaction. If the closeness effect is strongest an
increase in competition will lead to an increase in canvassing activity. However, if
effectiveness is decreasing in higher competitor effort, the effect of decreased effec-
tiveness will lead to a decrease in canvassing activity. Finally, it is also conceivable
that effectiveness increases in competitor effort, which will reinforce a positive effect
of competition on canvassing activity.
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Participation decision
To investigate the impact of changes in competition on the participation decision,
we explore the role of fixed cost c̃i. The fraction of individuals going canvassing at a
given optimal canvassing level d∗ is determined by the difference in utility between
participating and non-participating. The marginal activist should just be indifferent
between the two.
∆u = u(d∗, d−i, cd)− u(0, d−i, cd) = g (v(d∗i + d−i, cd)) + k(d∗i , cd)− c(d∗i )− c̃i
−g (v(d−i, cd))− k(0, cd) = 0
We assume that k(0, cd) = 0 ∀cd, that is individuals do not gain any expressive
utility if they do not canvass. Using the distributional assumption on c̃i, we obtain
the following equation for the fraction of active canvassers.
F (g (v(d∗i + d−i, cd)) + k(d
∗
i , cd)− c(d∗i )− g (v(d−i, cd)) (3)
To explore the impact on the participation decision, we take the first derivative
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< 0. Hence, the sign of the impact on the
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participation decision depends on the sum of two factors. First, the sign depends
on whether the effect of competition on additional votes generate (effectiveness)
increases or decreases in own canvassing. Second, the sign and magnitude of the
direct impact of competition on the expressive utility. Finally, the magnitude of the




In this section, we discuss one methodological facet of our study. As stated, in
addition to collecting rich behavioral data, the original survey also included two
self-reported outcomes. Specifically, we asked respondents whether they planned to
go canvassing and, if so, on how many days. Do the behavioral findings map onto
respondents’ self-reported intentions?24
In Table A21, we report treatment effects on respondents’ intentions to go can-
vassing. In contrast to the behavioral finding, we do not find a negative treatment
effect on canvassing intentions. If anything, there is a slight positive effect (though
the coefficient is insignificant without control variables). This short-term effect may
be a product of social pressure induced by the surveyor: Respondents might want
to please the party in reaction to learning about high levels of competitor effort. In
reality, however, they dropped out of the campaign. These results underscore the
necessity to collect unobtrusive behavioral data in order to reliably measure polit-
ical engagement. Relying on self-reported intentions to predict engagement would
have led to the wrong conclusion, namely, that the competition treatment mildly
increased engagement.
24In the pre-analysis plan, we pre-specified an index, which combines the behavioral and survey
data. We had anticipated that intentions and behaviors point into the same direction. But, given
that the survey responses are at odds with behavior, the index is of little empirical use.
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Table A21: Treatment effects on self-reported intentions
Planned canvassing Planned days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.027 0.046∗∗ 0.235 0.418
(0.027) (0.022) (0.378) (0.340)
Control mean 0.519 0.519 4.017 4.017
Observations 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402
Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: Table A21 presents coefficients and robust standard errors
(in parentheses) of a linear model (OLS), regressing the indicated
self-reported intentions on the treatment dummy for the full sam-
ple. “Planned canvassing” is a dummy indicating if respondents
plan to go canvassing. “Planned days” is a continuous variable
measuring the number of days respondents plan to go canvassing.
Pre-specified control variables include: party membership, num-
ber of years of party membership, age, gender, whether a partic-
ipant has participated in a canvassing training, whether a par-
ticipant has already downloaded the online application, whether
a participant has participated in canvassing before this national
election and whether a participant has canvassed in the current





We are conducting a short survey among our supporters to plan our electoral
campaign. Your participation helps us optimally use our campaign resources.
We will treat your answers confidentially. The survey only takes 5 minutes
(10 questions).
Thank you very much for your help!
• Gender
What is your gender?
• Age
How old are you?
• Party member
Are you a member of [own] party?
• Years of party membership (asked if respondent is a member)
For how many years have you been a member of [own] party?
• Canvassing workshop
Have you ever participated in a canvassing training workshop?
• Canvassing experience
Do you have any experience in canvassing in previous electoral campaigns?
• Prior belief
Think of 100 typical [competitor name] party members.
What do you think: How many of these 100 [competitor name] party members
plan to go canvassing during this electoral campaign?
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• Treatment text (randomly assigned)
You said X of 100 [competitor name] party members.
According to a survey of [competitor name] party members, 56 of 100 [com-
petitor name] party members plan to go canvassing during this electoral cam-
paign.
• Posterior belief
What do you think: How many of these 100 [competitor] party members will
actually go canvassing during this electoral campaign?
• Participation decision
Do you plan to go canvassing during this electoral campaign?
• Effort decision (asked if participation decision is ‘yes’)
On how many days do you plan to go canvassing during this electoral cam-
paign?
• Debrief
Now let’s go! And don’t forget to download the [party]-application. Available
here for iOS and Android.
With the [party]-application you can actively participate in our electoral cam-
paign and keep up to date with the campaign progress. Also, the application
is fun!
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